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NOTES
VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS REEXAMINED
-NEW LABELS OR A NEW APPROACH
The prolonged nature of American military participation in the
Southeast Asia conflict has necessitated the induction of thousands of
individuals from the civilian labor force. The result has been not only
an enormous turnover of military personnel but also a significant
amount of friction between labor and management regarding a former
employee's rights to reemployment. Probably the greatest reason for
this friction has been the lack of judicial uniformity in defining the
scope of these rights and the applicable statutes.
Most courts have necessarily turned to the Military Selective Serv-
ice Act of 19671 as their primary guide in determining veterans' re-
employment rights. Because this act is substantially the same in scope
2
and purposes as its predecessor, the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940,' the courts have also relied on the legislative history of the
1. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 451-73 (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. AP. § 451 (Supp.
m, 1968). The Military Selective Service Act consists of twenty-three sections, the
ninth containing all the veterans' reemployment rights provisions. 50 U.S.C. APP.
§ 459 (1964). For a comprehensive treatment of this section and an early case
history, see Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1279 (1953).
2. The key provisions of section 9 of the 1967 act are, with only minor excep-
tions, worded the same as were the corresponding provisions in section 8 of the 1940
act. The 1940 statute, however, applied only to "first enlistments," while the present
law covers all inductees, including reservists. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459(c)(3). (Supp.
Iff, 1968), amending 50 U.S.C. AP. § 459 (1964). The permitted duration of service
with reemployment guarantees was originally 3 years, but it has since been increased
to 5 years. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459(g)(1) (Supp. m, 1968), amending 50 U.S.C. APp.
§ 459(g) (1964). It has been remarked that the existing law made "no important sub-
stantive changes ... in the provisions of the 1940 act." U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 2003
(1948). See generally U.S. BUREAU OF VTERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTs, REEMPLOY-
MENT RIGHTS HANDBOOK (1954) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
3. The Committee Report of the Senate stated that congressional intent was for
the veteran to "be reemployed without loss of seniority or other benefits upon his return
to civil life." S. REP. No. 2002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940). See HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, at 15; U.S. CODE CONG. SEav. 2004 (1948).
4. Act of September 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885. After the limited duration
of the 1940 law had elapsed, Congress replaced the measure with the Selective Service
Act of 1948. In 1951 the legislation was renamed the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, although none of the prior reemployment rights provisions were signifi-
cantly altered. After a recent amendment, the title has finally been changed to the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967. Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1
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earlier statute.' The 1940 act, drafted and passed when entry into the
European war was imminent, was designed to implement the first plan
for permanent conscription. It is significant that this draft law could
not be passed, even in those perilous times, without the inclusion of a
reemployment rights section that provided a strong and clear-cut meas-
ure of job protection for veterans.'
Despite the legislative intent of the Selective Training and Service
Act and its successor to afford clear and comprehensive protection to a
returnee, courts have repeatedly had difficulty with portions of the statu-
tory language. This Note, however, does not attempt to discuss all the
issues raised in the 30-year history of veterans' reemployment legisla-
tion; most have already been exhaustively explored.7  Instead, this
Note will analyze the enlargement of reemployment "benefits" s as they
have appeared in the last several years, particularly since 1964.
I. "Seniority, Status, and Pay"
The 1967 act, like its predecessor, provides in subsection 9(b) that
if the returning serviceman has been honorably discharged and is still
qualified to perform the duties of his old task, he shall be restored to a
position of "like seniority, status, and pay."9  If the veteran is found to
be unqualified for the duties of his former position due to some disability
sustained in his military service, but he is capable of performing another
job for the same employer, he shall "be restored to such other position
. . .as will provide him like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest
(1), 81 Stat. 100, amending 50 U.S.C. APP. § 451 (1964) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 451 (Supp. II, 1968) ).
5. See, e.g., Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966), rev'g 341 F.2d
72 (2d Cir. 1965).
6. 86 CONG. REc. 10095 (1940) (remarks of Senator Sheppard).
7. E.g., Sherman, Seniority and Promotion Rights of Reemploycd Veterans,
17 U. PiTr. L. REv. 20 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Sherman]; Yote, Veterans' Re-
employment Rights under Selective Service Interpretations, 54 YALE L.J. 417 (1945);
Note, Veterans' Re-employment Rights under the Universal Military Training and
Service Act--Seniority Provisions, 1 GA. L. REv. 293 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note,
1 GA. L. RaV. 293]. While the 1945 Note is perhaps the best discussion of the early
application of the Selective Training and Service Act, and the article by Sherman is a
helpful source of information on several early cases, the 1967 Note is the most current
consideration of veterans' reemployment legislation in a legal periodical. Indeed, it
seems to be the only article published in this field during the last fifteen years.
8. These "benefits" are not to be confused with those administered by the Vet-
erans' Administration, such as disability pensions. The latter benefits have a clearly
different legal character. They are not vested rights but merely gratuities. Milliken v.
Gleason, 332 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1964).
9. 50 U.S.C. App. §8 459(b)(A)(i), 459(b)(B)(i), 459(b)(C)(i) (1964).
His job must be "other than a temporary position." Id. § 459(b). And his guarantee
against discharge without cause is for only one year. Id. § 459(c)(1) (1964).
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approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in his case;
... ,10 Paragraphs (A), 03), and (C) of subsection 9(b) extend
the protection of the act to both public and private employers, as long
as the veteran has made application for reinstatement within 90 days
from the date of his service discharge.1 '
The major difficulty with subsection 9(b) concerns the meaning
of the phrase "seniority, status, and pay." This difficulty arises be-
cause, as one court has remarked, "the term seniority is not precisely
defined in the Act and there are many variations in the use of the sen-
iority principle determined by the particular contract or practice in effect
in each case."'
2
Subsection 9(c) also contains three parts, the first two of which
have proven the most controversial. Paragraph (1) of 9(c) provides
that any person restored to a position in accordance with subsection
9(b) shall be considered "as having been on furlough or leave of ab-
sence during his period of training and service in the Armed Forces,
1 . .,," In addition, this paragraph assures the returning veteran that
he
shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to par-
ticipate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer
pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees
on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the
time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be
discharged from such position without cause within one year after
such restoration.
14
When subsection 9(c)(1) is read alone, it seems to intend a
parallel between the status of an employee returning from military duty
and the status of an employee returning from furlough. But para-
graph (2) of subsection 9(c) portrays this same status in what seems
to be a distinctly different manner:
It is declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person
who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (A) or 03) of subsection (b) should be so restored in
such manner as to give him such status in his employment as he
would have enjoyed if he had continued in such employment con-
tinuously from the time of his entering the armed forces until the
time of his restoration to such employment.'
5
10. Id. §§ 459(b)(A)(ii), 459(b)(B)(ii), 459(b)(C)(ii).
11. Id. §§ 459(b)(A), 459(b)(B), 459(b)(C); VETERANS' ADMiNISTRATION IN-
FORMATION SERVICE, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS 34 (March
1970).
12. Freeman v. General Motors Corp., 86 F. Supp. 527, 529 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
13. 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(c) (1) (1964). See notes 42-44 & accompanying text
infra.
14. 50 U.S.C. Aprp. § 459(c)(1) (1964).
15. Id. § 459(c) (2).
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The distinction lies in the terminology. Is restoration to be that of a
non-veteran who had been on furlough or is it to be that of one con-
tinuously employed?
II. The Early Years: Fishgold and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court first considered the "seniority" provisions of
these subsections in 1946 in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp.16 In that case petitioner was honorably discharged and rein-
stated to his old job in compliance with the Selective Training and Ser-
vice Act.17 Subsequently, he was laid off for 9 days during a slow-
down while non-veterans with higher shop "seniorities" were permitted
to remain working. The petitioner sought compensation for those days
during which he was placed in layoff status claiming that such an ac-
tion constituted a "discharge."
The Court held that there was a distinction between the terms
"layoff' and "discharge" as contemplated by the act and therefore de-
nied compensation. This distinction in terminology, although signifi-
cant in the Fishgold situation itself, has rarely been relied on since.
What has proved to be the enduring aspect of Fishgold is the language
used to describe the status of the ex-serviceman, language which has
since been cited by nearly every court considering the topic of veter-
ans' reemployment rights:
[The veteran] does not step back on the seniority escalator at the
point he stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he
would have occupied had he kept his position continuously dur-
ing the war. 8
This escalator analogy, although it can scarcely be called a defini-
tion, provided the initial recognition that "seniority" could not be con-
sidered a static concept. The Fishgold discussion, rather than serving
as the source of definition for "seniority" under the act, operated in-
stead as a catalyst or touch point for numerous lower court considera-
tions of the subject.' 9
16. 328 U.S. 275 (1946). The case is discussed in Note, Reemployment Rights
of the Veteran, 1 DUKE L.J. 75 (1951); Note, Current Problems of Veterans' Seniority,
37 GEO. L.J. 585 (1949).
17. See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
18. 328 U.S. at 284-85. "He acquires not only the same seniority he had; his
service in the armed services is counted as service in the plant so that he does not
lose ground by reason of his absence." Id. at 285.
19. E.g., Freeman v. General Motors Corp., 86 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich. 1949);
Harrison v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 77 F. Supp. 511 (E.D.S.C. 1948). The court in
Freeman considered each determination of "seniority" to be a unique one: "To this
end [assessing seniority] the following factors are given full consideration, in addition
to the basic factors of ability, length of service and value to the operation; family re-
sponsibilities, loyalty, competence and potentiality for promotion." 86 F. Supp. at 530.
See Note, 1 GA. L. REV. 293, supra note 7, at 298.
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Three years after the Fishgold decision, the Supreme Court faced
a similar problem in Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.2"
There a veteran complained of lost seniority after a geographical transfer,
and the Court was asked if the 1-year protection against discharge with-
out cause meant to imply that the seniority guarantee was also restricted
to that same period.2 1  The Court answered that question in the nega-
tive. As it construed the act, the majority felt seniority to be a right too
substantial to be removed after only a year's duration.22 Unfortunately,
the Court continued to avoid definition or clarification of the term
"seniority"; in this regard little improvement was made over Fishgold.
A. The Campbell Case: Veterans' Reemployment Rights Under
Collective Bargaining Agreements
In 1949 the Supreme Court considered whether a collective bar-
gaining agreement could be applied to a returning veteran if the agree-
ment had been negotiated during his absence.23 In holding that such an
agreement was applicable, 4 the Court settled what had been a conflict
between two courts of appeals. The Third Circuit had consistently held25
that the veteran was bound by the provisions of the agreement. The
Ninth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion in the case of Aero-
nautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell.26  In reversing the Ninth Circuit
decision, 27 the Supreme Court substantially adopted the Third Circuit
view.
20. 338 U.S. 278 (1949). The veteran is restored to "a position which, on the
moving escalator of terms and conditions affecting that particular employment, would
be comparable to the position which he would have held if he had remained continu-
ously in his civilian employment." Id. at 283.
21. The question in Oakley had been expressly reserved in Trailmobile Co. v.
Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 (1947), where the veteran's cause had been brought too late for
the Court to award relief and was therefore moot. Justice Jackson dissented in Whirls,
however, contending that the veteran should not be subject to loss of seniority after
only one year. "Seniority rights are rights which, by their nature, endure as long as
the employment does, and become more and more valuable in protecting that employ-
ment and enhancing its benefits. Ordinarily, one of the most important functions
is to give a measure of security in the job. To have seniority rights for a year may not
be an impossibility, but it is almost a contradiction in terms." Id. at 67.
22. "His seniority status . . . continues beyond the first year of his reemploy-
ment, subject to the advantages and limitations applicable to the other employees."
338 U.S. at 284.
23. Aeronautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
24. Id.
25. Payne v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1947); DiMaggio
v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1947); Koury v. Elastic Stop Nut
Corp., 162 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1947); Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d
448 (3d Cir. 1947).
26. 169 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
27. Aeronautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
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The factual situation in Campbell involved a contingency plan
which provided that union chairmen were to be accorded priorities over
all others in the event of a layoff. The Ninth Circuit had held that plain-
tiffs, returning veterans threatened with layoff, maintained a clear right
to report back to their jobs if others of lesser plant experience-includ-
ing the union leaders-were still working. 28  The appellate judges ap-
parently felt that "seniority," if it were to be correctly applied to a
veteran, could not be diluted by collective bargaining agreements made
during his absence.
2 9
The Supreme Court decision, however, stressed that there was no
real conflict between the act and the collective bargaining agreements.
Indeed the majority felt that the "seniority" aspects of the act fit rather
well into the normal framework of the employer-employee relationship.
By its passage of the veterans' reemployment legislation, "Congress
was not creating a system of seniority but recognizing its operation as
part of the process of collective bargaining."30  Therefore, in this case,
union chairmen were able to avoid layoffs while returning veterans were
not, simply because the prevailing collective bargaining agreements
gave the former the greatest seniority preference. The veteran was not
to possess a "super-seniority," a permanent job guarantee, but was
just to be assured of his position for the readjustment year, unless cir-
cumstances made this entirely unreasonable."
Essentially, this meant that a prospective plaintiff was compelled to
make a twofold showing to prevail in a reemployment rights case: First,
he needed to prove some form of injury; and second, he had to show
that this had not occurred naturally either through custom of the trade32
or through collective bargaining.13  The provisions of the act were
not designed to add to, but merely to protect the seniority already ac-
cumulated by the employee in the course and manner of his particular
employment."
28. 169 F.2d at 253.
29. See id.; accord, Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 448, 453
(3d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
30. 337 U.S. at 526 (emphasis added).
31. For example, an employer cannot be expected to restore a worker to a job
now rendered obsolete by automation, such as a string-knitter. Dyer v. Holston Mfg.
Co., 237 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
32. See id.
33. Burke v. Boston Edison Co., 279 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1968); Note,
1 GA. L. REv. 293, supra note 7, at 298. However, the burden of proof on the second
point rests with the employer if the restriction is tantamount to a "discharge without
cause."
34. Note, I GA. L. REv. 293, supra note 7, at 298. "ITIhe veteran won when
he was able to establish that, though he fulfilled all contract conditions, he would
still suffer a direct penalty for military service, unless the court granted him relief, and
lost when he could not demonstrate that his inferior position was produced by his mili-
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B. The Diehl Case
As the courts turned away from the thought of granting the vet-
eran "extra" seniority rights, they focused on another critical problem
of the act-the application of the "furlough" and "continuous employ-
ment" analogies of subsection 9(c)8 5 to the determination of a vet-
eran's seniority.36 Among the earlier cases, none illustrates the practi-
cal difficulties in making this application as much as does Diehl v. Le-
high Valley Railroad Co.37 In this 1955 case, a collective bargain-
ing agreement provided that the order in which different workers com-
pleted their mandatory 1160-day experience program would determine
their "seniority." The plaintiff was inducted into the Armed Forces
before completion of his program. When he returned and finished the
requisite 1160 days, he was accorded seniority as of the day of com-
pletion (January 10, 1949), not as of the date he would have completed
his experience had he remained at the job without interruption for mili-
tary service (June 1, 1946). Diehl filed suit to have himself placed
ahead of four other employees who completed their 1160 days' experi-
ence between 1946 and 1949." s
The Supreme Court accorded Diehl this relief in a one-sentence
per curiam opinion:
Upon the facts disclosed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, 211 F.2d 95, the applicable Acts of Congress, and
the opinion of this Court in Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
338 U.S. 278, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 39
The meaning of the Court's action is not entirely clear. In fact, it has
been subjected to at least two interpretations.
The Third Circuit had felt that awarding Diehl seniority as of 1946
would be giving him "a kind of superseniority not contemplated by any
statute."40  It stressed that the longevity standard included in the
collective bargaining agreement applied to all employees, veterans or
non-veterans. 41
This sort of case, at least as the Third Circuit viewed it, required
consideration of the analogies drawn from paragraphs (1) and (2)
tary service." Id. at 304, quoting SOLICrrOR'S LEGAL GunnE AND CASE DIGEsT-
VETERANS' RE-EMPLOYMENT RIGiTS § 6.333, at 808 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SOLICI-
TOR'S GuiDE].
35. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
36. E.g., 348 U.S. 960 (1955), rev'g per curiam 211 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1954).
37. 348 U.S. 960 (1955).
38. Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 211 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd per curiam,
348 U.S. 960 (1955). The facts were not stated in the Supreme Court opinion.
39. 348 U.S. at 961 (1955).
40. Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 211 F.2d 95, 100. (3rd Cir. 1954).
41. Id.
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of subsection 9(c) of the act. 42  In paragraph (1), the employee's
status during his departure is likened to a "furlough" or "leave of ab-
sence." In paragraph (2), however, he is described as having a status
akin to that of one "continuously employed" for the period in question.
The court suggested that, in order to reconcile these views, the act
must have meant the categorizations to be equivalent and interchange-
able.43 In effect, this interpretation would mean that the court could
frame its opinion in the language of either paragraph, whichever ap-
peared more appropriate to its decision. The Third Circuit preferred
the "furlough" terminology and held that the veteran was restricted to
whatever benefits the railroad agreed to give "non-veterans" on fur-
lough."
The Supreme Court,45 by relying on Oakley in reversing the Third
Circuit, probably felt that the "continuous employment" language was
the only possible choice for the problem in Diehl. Thus the veteran, to
be reinstated to his proper place on the seniority escalator, must be
treated "as though he had remained continuously in his civilian em-
ployment." 6 In an attempt to indicate the scope of the Court's action,
one writer remarked that this decision suggested the adoption of a more
flexible approach in evaluating veterans' reemployment rights.47 The
"flexible approach" would award benefits if it were only "reasonably
certain" that promotion or advancement would occur.4 Another writer
maintains that Diehl made no changes in prior law; it was merely a re-
statement of the prevailing rule regarding the automatic accrual of
seniority.4 9  This rule, the so-called "automatic accrual" standard,
would provide that the veteran was entitled only to those benefits
which he would have automatically attained "but for" his military par-
ticipation time.50
C. The McKinney Qualification
Another veterans' reemployment rights case provided a measure of
clarification. McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.,5 de-
cided 3 years after Diehl, presented a problem dealing with "promo-
tion" as opposed to "seniority." In this case McKinney, a returning
veteran, missed one opportunity for promotion because he had not been
42. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
43. 211 F.2d at 99.
44. Id.
45. 348 U.S. 960 (1955).
46. Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R., 338 U.S. 278, 285 (1949).
47. Note, I GA. L. REV. 293, supra note 7, at 304.
48. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
49. Sherman, supra note 7, at 35.
50. See, e.g., Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948).
51. 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
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discharged from military duty until 3 weeks after the opening was an-
nounced. The railroad selected an entirely new employee for the job.
Subsequent to his reinstatement McKinney was promoted to a level ap-
proximately equal to that of the new employee, but he was demoted
shortly thereafter when the position to which he had been promoted was
abolished. McKinney brought suit to compel the railroad to place him
in the position then occupied by the new employee with a seniority date
he would have had if he had been given the opportunity to accept the
prior promotion. The veteran sought to justify his claim under the pro-
tection against "loss of seniority" in the act.
The Supreme Court denied McKinney's right to the higher-ranked
job. The Court said that advancement was guaranteed by the act only
under circumstances where its obtainment would have been automatic
had the employee remained at the job rather than entering the mili-
tary.52 But here promotion depended upon elements of fitness, abil-
ity, and managerial discretion; for that reason neither the promotion nor
the additional seniority sought by the returning veteran was warranted.
In addition to applying the "automatic accrual" standard, the
McKinney decision placed an important qualification upon it: auto-
matic accrual cannot override managerial discretion. But the restrictive
tone of the opinion may have overemphasized this qualification. As
one writer observed:
The McKinney case has been considered by several lower courts as
putting a drastic limitation on the application of the escalator princi-
ple of promotions and the resulting seniority; language in the
opinion has been applied to situations very different from factual
considerations by the Supreme Court.
53
This tendency was probably due to the fact that few employment situa-
tions do not contain some variable, however minor, which would render
promotion less than automatic. 4 Under such circumstances it be-
came apparent that the "automatic accrual" standard might prove un-
workable.
52. Id. at 272. The Court affirmed with leave to amend to include an allegation
that McKinney's promotion was automatic under the existing collective bargaining
agreement Id. at 274.
53. Note, 1 GA. L. Rav. 293, supra note 7, at 305, quoting SoLicIToles GuEDE
806.
54. Such a variable has been held to defeat other changes in status contemplated
by the veteran as well as promotions. Horton v. United States Steel Corp., 286 F.2d
710 (5th Cir. 1961) (transfer); Sularz v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 259
F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1958) (seniority listing); Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 288 F.
Supp. 169 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (rank on copilot-pilot seniority list); Alfarone v. Fairchild
Stratos Corp., 218 F. Supp. 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (step rate pay increase); Conseglio v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 211 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (promotion).
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D. The First Strains of the Doctrine of "Reasonable Certainty"
The severity of the McKinney standard was not diminished until
6 years later, when the Supreme Court considered Tilton v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co.55 In that case a worker returned to his job after
military duty only to discover that some men who were junior prior to
his departure had since passed him on the seniority list and thereby at-
tained greater security against a possible layoff. The veteran con-
tended that this ranking resulted in a "loss of seniority" in violation
of the statute.56 The lower court had held that promotion and deter-
mination of Tilton's seniority level depended on too many variables-
such as good health, willingness to accept greater responsibilities, and
managerial discretion-to be considered "automatic"; for that reason
seniority could not be accorded retroactively."
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. 5 The Court pointed out
that "seniority" and "status" were standards which could only be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis under the act, and the attributes of these
standards could scarcely ever be entirely foreseeable:
It would be virtually impossible for a veteran to show, as the Court
of Appeals would require, that it was absolutely certain, "as a
matter of foresight" when he entered military service, that all cir-
cumstances essential to obtaining an advancement in status would
later occur. . . . This requirement is met if, as a matter of fore-
sight, it was reasonably certain that advancement would have oc-
curred, and if, as a matter of hindsight, it did in fact occur.59
It would appear that the language used by the Court was meant to
sanction a more liberal, flexible approach in the determination of veter-
ans' reemployment rights. 60 Its effect has been to stem the tide of
cases giving extensive application to McKinney. More specifically,
the Tilton opinion limited the scope of McKinney by rejecting "auto-
matic accrual" as a guideline in cases where the veteran sought advance-
ment.
The introduction of "reasonably certain to occur" rather than
"automatically accruing" more nearly approximated the escalator anal-
ogy first announced nearly 20 years earlier: a serviceman should be re-
stored to a rank neither farther along nor farther behind that rank which
he would have attained but for military duty, with any reasonable doubt
as to his reemployment rights resolved in behalf of the returnee. 61 The
Court concluded in Tilton:
55. 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
56. 86 CONG. REc. 10095, 10107 (1940) (remarks of Senators Danaher and
Sheppard). See text accompanying note 14 supra.
57. Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 306 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 169 (1964).
58. Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
59. Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added).
60. See Note, 1 GA. L. REv. 293, supra note 7, at 310.
61. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
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In every veteran seniority case the possibility exists that work
of the particular type might not have been available; that the vet-
eran would not have worked satisfactorily during the period of his
absence; that he might not have elected to accept the higher po-
sition; or that sickness might have prevented him from continuing
his employment. In light of the purpose and history of this stat-
ute, we cannot assume that Congress intended possibilities of this
sort to defeat the veteran's seniority rights.
62
LII. "Seniority" v. "Other Benefits"
After the Tilton decision in 1964, a considerable number of vet-
erans' reemployment rights cases have turned on the criterion of "reason-
able certainty."63  Even so, another reemployment rights problem has
arisen that has compelled the courts to go beyond the limits of even
this broad term; but in so doing, many courts64 have relied on the lib-
eral interpretation of the statute as inferred from Tilton and the early
case of Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.6 5 The problem
involves the relationship between the terms "seniority" and "other bene-
fits" protected by subsection 9(c), paragraphs (1) and (2).66
In the early cases all employment benefits were held to fall dis-
tinctly into one or the other of these two categories. This approach
made it relatively easy for early opinions to decide whether to apply
the "leave of absence" analogy67 or the "continuous employment" anal-
62. 376 U.S. at 180-81, accord, Brooks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 182,
rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 966 (1964).
63. Montgomery v. Southern Elec. Steel Co., 410 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1969)
(retroactive departmental seniority); Hatton v. Tabard Press Corp., 406 F.2d 593
(2d Cir. 1969) (promotion); Collins v. Weirton Steel Co., 398 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.
1968) (advancement); Power v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 388 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1968)
(promotion); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 66-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 8411
(1966) (promotion or transfer); cf. Teamsters Local 612 v. Helton, 413 F.2d 1380 (5th
Cir. 1969) (advancement) (dictum); Moe v. Eastern Air Lines, 246 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1957) (wage increase); Brickner v. Johnson Motors, 299 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. 111. 1969)
(seniority) (dictum).
64. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Southern Elec. Steel Co., 410 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.
1969). As stated by one district court, there were "many practical situations where
(c) (1) literally applied [could] negative the 'escalator' principle of the Act." Accardi
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
65. 328 U.S. 275 (1946). See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
67. See Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957); Alvado v. General
Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956);
Dougherty v. General Motors Corp., 176 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 956 (1950); Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948); Siaskiewicz v.
General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948); Monticue v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 91 F.
Supp. 561 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Woods v. Glen Alden Co., 73 F. Supp. 871 (M.D. Pa.
1947).
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ogy.68 The majority of such courts69 reasoned that the safeguard
against "loss" in subsection 9(c)(1) extended only to seniority rights
because the act stated that these rights "shall" not be lost by mere entry
into the service." It was maintained that the choice of the word "shall"
indicated an imperative.71 "Other benefits," not mentioned until the
subsequent clause in the act, were merely "open to participation."72
For this reason, most courts7 3 had felt that the legislative intent was to
avoid judicial intervention where only "other benefits" were at stake.
A. Accardi, Eagar, and the Modern Trend
Two Supreme Court cases have, since 1966, begun to cause dif-
ficulties in this approach to the determination of veterans' reemploy-
ment benefits. They have erased to some extent the fine distinctions
previously held concerning "seniority, status, and pay" and "other bene-
fits."
1. The A ccardi Case
In one of the Supreme Court cases, Accardi v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co.,7 4 petitioners were veterans who had returned to their em-
ployment as railroad firemen just as a strike settlement was being ef-
fected. The terms of the settlement were that firemen with at least 20
years' seniority could remain active, and the rest were to be given sev-
erance pay commensurate with the duration of their "compensated
service. '' 75 Petitioners claimed that their military time should be in-
cluded as part of this service, since they would otherwise be deprived
of "seniority, status, and pay." The railroad disagreed.
In the federal district court where Accardi originally brought his
claim for relief, he was awarded summary judgment 76 on the basis
of Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.77 and other cases78
68. See Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 182 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950); Seattle Star, Inc. v. Randolph, 168 F.2d 274 (9th Cir.
1948); Mentzel v. Diamond, 167 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1948).
69. E.g., Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966), rehear-
ing denied, 380 F.2d 321 (1967), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 323 (1967), rehearing
denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968).
70. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
71. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
72. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
73. See cases cited notes 67 & 69 supra.
74. 383 U.S. 225 (1966), rev'g 341 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1965).
75. A month of "compensated service" was defined as any month in which an
employee worked at least one day, and a year of "compensated service" was explained
as "12 such months or major portion thereof." 383 U.S. at 228.
76. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
77. 328 U.S. 275 (1946). See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
78. E.g., Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
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supporting a liberal construction of the veterans' reemployment provi-
sions. The Second Circuit, citing its own earlier decisions in this
field,70 reversed in favor of the railroad. s0  The separation allowances,
this court felt, were "other benefits" not compensable as "seniority,
status, and pay."81
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Accardi, and the ma-
jority voted to reverse the Second Circuit and to reinstate the district
judge's award to petitioners.8 2 The Court held that failure to credit pe-
titioners' "compensated service" time with that spent in the Armed Forces
would essentially mean a "loss of seniority,"83 and that loss was dis-
tinctly proscribed by the act. 4 Reinstatement without loss of status
was clearly recognized to entail protection of other rights besides pri-
ority of rank. The Court stated: "The requirements of the 1940 Act
are not satisfied by giving returning veterans seniority in some general
abstract sense and then denying them the perquisites and benefits that
flow from it."'85
The Court emphasized the escalator analogy and the congressional
mandate to provide comprehensive protection for persons called into
the Armed Forces. In order to implement this goal, the Court insisted
that: "The term 'seniority' is not to be limited by a narrow, technical
definition but must be given a meaning that is consonant with the in-
tention of Congress as expressed in the 1940 Act.' 86 This was to be
accomplished in part by avoiding the use of "transparent labels and
definitions to deprive a veteran of substantial rights guaranteed by the
Act."81 7  "Compensated service" was apparently such a label, and for
that reason this term was ignored in the assessment of Accardi's seni-
ority. Thus, he was entitled to the severance pay as provided in the
strike agreement.
79. Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957); Alvado v. General
Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956); Dwyer
v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948); Siaskiewiez v. General Elec. Co., 166
F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948).
80. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1965).
81. Id. In the words of the Second Circuit, the severance allotments "seem-
ingly constituted only a miscellaneous benefit, devised ad hoc after intensive collective
bargaining in order to serve a transitory purpose." Id. at 75; accord, Hire v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1963). The Second Circuit in
Accardi also remarked that it classified separation allowances as "other benefits," al-
though expressing "some doubts" as to the accuracy of this classification. 341 F.2d at
75.
82. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
83. Id. at 230-31.
84. See notes 14 & 56 & accompanying text supra.
85. 383 U.S. at 230.
86. id. at 229.
87. Id.
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But are "other benefits" also transparent in nature? The Court
in Accardi states, although merely in dictum, that such language is not
transparent and refers to the legislative background of the amendment
that provided for its inclusion in the 1940 act: "That amendment
would make certain that all trainees would receive the same insurance
and other benefits as those who are on furlough or leave of absence in
private life."88
The opinion in Accardi, although assertedly in support of a liberal
approach to the granting of reemployment benefits, presents some de-
gree of difficulty because of its language. For example, the Court
speaks on the one hand of a broadened concept of seniority 0 and that
subsection 9(c) was intended to add certain protections. ° But on the
other hand, when the Court seeks to describe the guaranteed benefits, it
refers to those "which would have automatically accrued' 91 to the vet-
eran had he not entered the military. Which is it to be? Automatic or
reasonable certainty?
Possibly the Court was attempting to restrict the doctrine of "rea-
sonable certainty" as previously announced in Tilton to promotion sit-
uations alone and not to the determination of other applicable benefits
such as compensated service; but this seems a bit difficult to justify in
light of the liberal congressional mandate. However, at least one writer
has taken just this position in his assessment of Accardi and has con-
tended that the language was intended to dispel any notion that Tilton
had abolished the "automatic accrual" requirement.2
2. The Eagar Decision
Another Supreme Court case bearing on the distinction between
"seniority" and "other benefits" was Eagar v. Magma Copper Co."3
Eagar94 had left for military service on March 6, 1959, only 6 days be-
fore his first full working year would have been completed. Within
90 days after he had finished his military duty, Eagar returned to his job.
A collective bargaining agreement drafted by his union provided that
at the end of a work year, an employee who worked 75 percent of the
88. Id. at 231, quoting 86 CONG. REc. 10914 (1940) (remarks of Senator Shep-
pard).
89. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
90. 383 U.S. at 232.
91. Id. at 229 (emphasis added). This phrase is located in the sentence of the
opinion immediately following the Court's suggestion to avoid a narrow definition of
seniority.
92. Note, 1 GA. L. REV. 293, supra note 7, at 308.
93. 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (per curiam), rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968).
94. Although there were actually four plaintiffs, the facts in the case of plaintiff
Eagar were stipulated to be representative; therefore, they were the only facts discussed
in the Ninth Circuit opinion. Id.
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available shifts that year and was employed on his 1-year anniversary
date (1 year after his hiring) was entitled to a paid vacation. For a paid
holiday, employees under this contract were compelled to work the
shifts immediately prior to and after the holiday. They were also re-
quired to be on the company payroll continuously for 3 months before
the holiday.
Less than 3 months after his reinstatement, Eagar worked the ap-
propriate shifts before and after a special holiday which he desired, and
properly requested, to take off with pay. He also wanted his paid vaca-
tion; but the company refused to allow either the holiday or the paid
vacation since he had been "absent" on his anniversary date (March
12, 1959) and he had not been listed on the payroll continuously for
3 months.
The Ninth Circuit had felt that this absence was sufficient to free
the company of any obligation 5 because the veteran should not be
entitled to gratuities unavailable to nonveteran employees if they had
been on furlough for a similar period.96 Consequently, it dismissed
both holiday pay and vacation pay as simply "other benefits." Under
its categorization, the court felt that seniority should include rights
which automatically accrue as a direct incident of length of job tenure.9 7
It excluded as "other benefits" that "fairly narrow group of economic
advantages whose common quality [is] that they [are] miscellaneous
fringe benefits not usually regarded as part of 'pay,' 'status,' or 'sen-
iority.' ,,98
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in a per
curiam opinion"9 that cited only to the Accardi case. Did this mean
merely an extension of the Accardi view to include vacation pay as well
as severance pay, or was the Court suggesting the adoption of a more
flexible standard? The former view has support in the dissent registered
by Judge Madden of the Ninth Circuit when Eagar was considered for
rehearing at that level. 100 Rather than attempt to draw a fine line be-
tween the attendant and fringe benefits of the veteran's position, Judge
Madden stressed that the sole issue was simply whether or not the
benefits would have accrued automatically to the worker had he never
entered the military service.' 01
95. Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966).
96. Id. at 321.
97. See id. The Ninth Circuit relied on the terminology used in Siaskiewicz v.
General Electric Co., 166 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1948), where vacation pay was denied
because the claimant was not on the job for 6 months during the year in question be-
cause of his military duty.
98. 380 F.2d at 320-21, quoting Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735, 738
(2d Cir. 1957).
99. Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323 (1967).
100. Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 321 (1967).
101. Id. at 322.
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Not all courts have subsequently adopted Judge Madden's out-
look, 10 2 and several have distinguished the Eagar decision on its nar-
row factual situation."0 3 Yet if careful reading is made of Justice
Douglas' dissent to the Eagar judgment,10 4 it becomes apparent that
the majority was implying a narrowing, if not a rejection, of the distinc-
tions once held regarding the "seniority" and "other benefits" clauses.
Douglas stated that he could not see how Eagar concerned "seniority";
but rather, it seemed to him that vacation pay under the contract turned
strictly on "other benefits." He indicated that the majority, however,
refused to limit the liberal application of the act to "seniority" alone:
Accardi admonishes the courts to give the term "seniority" a broad
interpretation. . . . But Accardi did not involve the "other bene-
fits" clause, which must be applicable in this clear fringe-benefits
case [Eagar] if at all.1 5
Perhaps the clearest statement of the effect of the Eagar decision
comes not from a contemporary case but from a lower court case de-
cided similarly nearly two decades ago:
Vacation advantages accorded employees are certainly no less to be
prized than such benefits as pensions, bonuses, and participation in
insurance programs; and the Congressional history of [the act]
makes it clear that the statute was intended to protect these other
rights.' 0
6
B. The Aftermath of Accardi and Eagar: The Appellate Level
Since the decision in Eagar, the appellate level cases in the area
of veterans' reemployment rights have tended to split in their approach
to what is encompassed by the word "seniority." Those sanctioning
protection of a wide variety of benefits, even in the face of restrictive
labor agreements, now maintain a slight (2-1) numerical lead.'07 In
102. See, e.g., Morton v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 277 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1967),
rev'd, 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
103. Tuttle v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 293 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ore. 1968); Bradley v.
General Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
104. Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
105. Id. at 325. Douglas believed that the liberal protection awarded the return-
ing veteran as to his "status" was not meant to include eligibility for fringe benefits.
For if such items were part of a protected right, "Congress would not have left un-
changed the explicit provision that 'other benefits' are to be disposed of as if the re-
turning serviceman had been on leave of absence." Id. at 326 n.3.
106. MacLaughlin v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 166 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1948).
This was the crux of Eagar's argument in the lower courts. Indeed, his attorney
stated that subsection 9(c) (1) "plainly requires that the restored veteran is to be simi-
larly treated with respect to all types of benefits-i.e., seniority, status and pay as well
as insurance and other benefits." Brief for Appellee at 14, Magma Copper Co. v.
Eagar, 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966).
107. Edwards v. Clinchfield R.R., 408 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1969) (award granted);
Morton v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969) (award granted);
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fact, the trend seems to be in this direction as well, since the two latest
appellate decisions wholly reject the limitations posed by Mr. Justice
Douglas' dissent in Eagar.108
This trend may best be perceived by a study of the three individual
decisions, each determined by a different circuit. In all three cases
the factual situations were similar. Each involved an employee who
had left his job with a railroad to serve 2 years in the military and then
returned to find that the 2 years would not be credited in the computa-
tion of his vacation pay. Each employer-employee relationship was
governed by a union-sponsored collective bargaining agreement that
provided for vacation allotments according to the duration of "com-
pensated service."' °
In Morton v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co.,1 0 the Eighth
Circuit presented the most complete discussion of such a situation to
date. The railroad stated bluntly that "vacation pay," notwithstanding
the Eagar holding, was not an element of seniority under the act, but
rather should be considered as one of the "other benefits.""' Secondly,
the railroad argued that an award to the veteran of pay for a period
during which he performed no labor would be discriminatory against
nonveterans, since the latter could not obtain pay on such a basis. By
this line of reasoning, Accardi could be distinguished on the grounds
that it applied only when "the seniority rights [of the veteran] sprang
from actual work performed."" 2 Thirdly, the railroad distinguished
Eagar as a simple application of the automatic accrual rule: "[Eagar]
had actually earned vacation pay and he would have received that pay-
ment had he stayed with the company for another week." 113 Lastly,
the railroad argued that the benefit termed "vacation pay" was, in effect,
"additional wages" and therefore distinct and separate from the whole
range of benefits flowing from seniority." 4  These four contentions of
the defendant in Morton are the most all-inclusive attack on the widen-
ing of veterans' benefits; one or more of these contentions has been
presented in all the other recent cases where an employer was seeking to
Dugger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 403 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1968), rehearing denied, 403 F.2d
719 (1969) (award denied).
108. Edwards v. Clinchfield R.R., 408 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1969); Morton v. Gulf, M.
& O.R.R., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
109. The three courts generally agreed upon the definition of "compensated serv-
ice" as a specific number of days or years of "continuous employment" required to
merit certain benefits. See, e.g., Dugger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 403 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1968), rehearing denied, 403 F.2d 719 (1969).
110. Morton v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
111. Id. at 417.
112. Id. at 415.
113. Id.
114. Morton v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 277 F. Supp. 434, 437 (E.D. Mo. 1967), rev'd,
405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
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limit the scope of reemployment rights.
The Eighth Circuit, however, was unpersuaded by the four con-
tentions of the railroad. It reversed in favor of the veteran.' 15  The
court reasoned that only a single determination was required:
The issue here ... is whether vacation pay is a seniority right
under the statute. If so, Morton's service time counts; if not,
Morton is to be treated as any other employee who had been on
non-military leave. 116
The court held that vacation pay in this situation was a seniority right
and employed certain language suggesting a very liberal point of view:
Seniority, while not defined in the statute, derives its meaning from
traditional private employment practices and agreements ...
The broad scope of seniority rights for re-employed veterans
under the Act are [sic] not to be eroded by fine factual distinc-
tions. Congress has painted veteran's re-employment benefits
with a full brush and not with a narrow stylus. 17
In Edwards v. Clinchfield Railroad Co., 18 the Sixth Circuit drew
upon the Eighth Circuit's treatment of Morton and affirmed a decision
for the veteran. The court reduced the case to two issues. First, what
is the meaning of the words "continuous employment" as used in 9(c)
of the act?119 If there were to be a broad construction of that term,'1
20
certainly the employee who was on the payroll both before and after
his military commitment could be seen as maintaining job continuity.
Second, and more important, was Edwards' military time truly "com-
pensated service?" That is, did the use of the term "compensated serv-
ice" in the collective bargaining agreement include military service?
The railroad argued that the veteran was in a sort of "limbo"
status like a nonveteran who had requested a leave of absence.'
2'
After all, such a position seemed appropriate in view of the language
of 9(c)(1).' 22 The court, however, dismissed this argument. In so
doing, it ignored the entire "leave of absence" concept and curtly stated
that the veteran must be treated "as having been continuously employed
on compensated service during the entire period of his armed serv-
ice. '  Thus, like Morton, Edwards accrued seniority for vacation
purposes during the 2 years he served in the military.
115. Morton v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
116. Id. at 417.
117. Id. at 419.
118. 408 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1969).
119. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
120. See Taylor v. Southern Pac. Co., 308 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (con-
struing the term broadly); accord, Saleck v. Great N. Ry., 277 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn.
1967).
121. See Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (dissenting opinion),
rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968).
122. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
123. 408 F.2d at 6.
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The only appellate court to reject the award of vacation pay to a
returning veteran was the Fifth Circuit in the anomalous decision of
Dugger v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.'2 4  In the district court de-
cision,125 the court rejected the employee's claim as falling within the
category of "other benefits." Based on that determination, the lower
court felt the applicable analogy of the act was the "leave of absence"
analogy. If this standard were properly applied, then "Dugger, as a re-
turning veteran, [was] not entitled to vacation rights which non-re-
turning veteran employees on leave of absence could not receive."' 26
Since the district court decided this case several weeks before the
Supreme Court considered the Eagar case, and'since the district court
relied so heavily on the reversed Ninth Circuit decision, it would not
have been anticipated that the appellate court in Dugger would have af-
firmed. Yet this is exactly what occurred. In a per curiam decision,
the Fifth Circuit held that no pay should be awarded. 127  In a very
literal interpretation it held that "any right to vacation pay must depend
upon the terms of the labor agreement between the railroad and its
employees."'
28
C. The Aftermath of Accardi and Eagar: The District Court Level
The appellate courts' inconsistency in their analysis of veterans'
reemployment benefits and in their manner of interpreting the critical
passages of the 1967 act 29 is echoed in the lower tribunals. While
waiting for Supreme Court clarification of the meaning of Eagar, the
district courts have taken two identifiable approaches.
Of the five recent district court cases touching upon the question
of the scope of benefits covered by the act, three took positions approxi-
mately the same as the "majority" at the appellate level.'30 The other
124. 403 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1968), rehearing denied, 403 F.2d 719 (1969).
125. Dugger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 276 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Tex. 1967), affd,
403 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1968).
126. 276 F. Supp. at 499.
127. 403 F.2d at 719.
128. Id. The only provision in the labor agreement which related to vacation
credit of a worker who had returned from military service provided, according to the
district court, "that an employee who either worked seven months or performed service
sufficient to qualify him for a vacation in the year prior to becoming a member of the
armed forces was entitled to a credit of the time spent with the armed forces in deter-
mining the length of vacations for which he would qualify upon his return." 276 F.
Supp. at 498. These provisions seem to suggest, then, that the employee is not pro-
tected under his labor agreement as to actual eligibility for a paid vacation; but rather,
if he meets the management requirement of 7 months' service and is thereby made
eligible for paid vacation, at that point only is his armed services time considered as a
factor.
129. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
130. Kelly v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 293 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Barry
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two cases demonstrated a possible limitation in the degree to which the
liberal grant of benefits may be applied.1
3
1
One of the former group of decisions was a Minnesota case, Saleck
v. Great Northern Railway Co.' 32  In this case the veteran worked
under a contract which restricted the allocation of vacation pay to per-
sons who had performed 133 days of "compensated service." The
award was to be made to an employee each year in which he met the
requirement. Saleck was denied payment for his vacation when he
returned to the job from active military duty. The court experienced
little difficulty in justifying the award. Relying on the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Accardi and upon the "escalator" principle, the court
held that "vacation benefits, like severance pay, are . . .bestowed in
reward for length of service and in consideration for the growing com-
mitment an employee makes to his job by the length of that service.
' '133
A similar decision was rendered in Kelly v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Railroad Co.,' another district court case with virtually
the same factual situation (except that the duration of annual "compen-
sated service" required by the collective bargaining agreement in Kelly
was only 120 days). The court commented that, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Eagar, it would have been inclined to deny vaca-
tion pay.13 5 However, in light of the more liberal approach suggested
by the Eagar case, the district judge felt certain that relief was war-
ranted for the employee:
A careful reading of the reversed circuit court decision [in Eagar]
together with a reading of the dissenting opinion written by Mr.
Justice Douglas and concurred in by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr.
Justice Stewart convinces me that the high court held that a plain-
tiff similarly situated was entitled to his vacation time notwith-
standing the fact that he rendered no compensated service during
the antecedent period.
1 36
The third district court case dealing with vacation pay that supports
the liberal interpretation of labor agreements in favor of the veteran was
Barry v. Smith.'37  In this case plaintiff, a railroad car cleaner, sought
a 20-day paid vacation open only to those employees whose continuous,
compensated service totaled at least 20 straight years. Plaintiff had en-
v. Smith, 285 F. Supp. 801 (D. Mass. 1968); Saleck v. Great N. Ry., 277 F. Supp. 936
(D. Minn. 1967).
131. Tuttle v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 293 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ore. 1968); Bradley v.
General Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968). See text accompanying notes
144 & 150 infra.
132. 277 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1967).
133. Id. at 939.
134. 293 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
135. Id. at 424.
136. Id.
137. 285 F. Supp. 801 (D. Mass. 1968).
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tered the military after his first 3 months on the job, served for several
years, and returned to his job for a period just short of 20 years. The
employer contended that plaintiff was properly classified as one whose
service was between 15 and 20 years, for which classification the maxi-
mum paid vacation was 15 days.
The court in Barry treated this as a simple "seniority" problem and
apparently reasoned that the veteran would have obtained this vacation
pay automatically had he merely been on the job for another 2 years
rather than in the military service. What the court actually relied upon
was a similarity between vacation pay and severance allowances, the
latter benefits having already been termed incidents of seniority in the
Accardi case.13 8 However, the court was compelled to meet another,
more substantial objection raised by the railroad. According to the
collective bargaining agreement in operation when Barry left for the
service, a worker was required to be employed for 7 months before he
could get credit for his military service in the determination of vacation
rights. 13 9 The court summarily dispelled this objection by stating that
the 1967 act "applies to all non-temporary jobs without any qualifying
time limit .... .10
The prevailing approach to the act is weakened somewhat by the
decisions in Tuttle v. U.S. Plywood Corp.141 and Bradley v. General
Motors Corp.42 In both cases plaintiffs were returning veterans who
had been refused specific benefits because they had not satisfied the
requirement of meeting a certain workload. In Tuttle, the governing
collective bargaining agreement stated that vacation pay was predicated
solely upon the completion of the workload (some 640 hours the pre-
ceding vacation base year); in Bradley, however, the workload pre-
requisite was added to a provision based on seniority.
In Tuttle the court assessed the meaning of the Supreme Court ac-
tion in Accardi some 3 years earlier as simply warning employers that
they could not avoid "seniority" provisions by using other labels. 4 By
this argument, Accardi could not truly be regarded as leaning toward a
radically different concept of benefits.
Tuttle also distinguished Eagar on its facts; the latter decision
was interpreted to hold merely that an award is proper if the employee
had already substantially met the longevity requirements. The same
situation did not exist in Tuttle, since the contract in question sanc-
tioned paid allotments only for bona fide work. Seniority was not in-
138. Id. at 806.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 293 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ore. 1968).
142. 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
143. 293 F. Supp. at 403.
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volved. "Work," according to the court, meant output by the laborer,
not simply the passage of time.' Under this categorization, holiday
and vacation compensation for the first year back from military duty
were not possible if a collective bargaining agreement specified a fixed
number of hours of work the preceding base year. The compensa-
tion could not be reasoned as an element of seniority, since every worker
of the plant was subject to the identical time limitation. And, as the
court stated in Tuttle:
If a benefit is not perquisite of seniority, then the veteran is en-
titled to it only if it is provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement or the employment rules relating to employees on fur-
lough or leave of absence.
145
In Bradley, also, the veteran was seeking a benefit-absence al-
lowance credit' 4q6-which the employer contended was predicated upon
actual labor. According to the contract involved, an employee who de-
sired this allowance must have satisfied two requirements. First, he
must have achieved 1 year of company seniority; and, second, he must
have actually worked at least thirteen pay periods prior to his eligibility
date. Then and only then did the award accrue, and could only be
awarded during the next eligibility year.' 47  Because of his military
service, Bradley was unable to meet the second company requirement;
he performed no "work" in any of the fifty-two pay periods of the
eligibility year for which he sought to be compensated.
Bradley based his claim for relief on the principles stated in
Accardi and on a literal interpretation of Eagar. The court, in granting
summary judgment to the employer, distinguished Accardi as deter-
mining "seniority"; and the award in that case, severance pay, "was
[direct] compensation for loss of jobs."' 48  The court reasoned that
absence allowance credit in this case was not a perquisite of seniority
since the bargaining agreement required actual work after the neces-
sary seniority level was reached.
144. Id. For emphasis of the proposition that military service may not act as a
substitute for actual work time in the computation of vacation pay, see HANDBOOK supra
note 2, at 89.
145. 293 F. Supp. at 402.
146. The absence allowance credit was explained as a sort of deferred earnings.
Bradley v. General Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481, 485 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
147. Id. As an example of the purportedly faulty logic of the plaintiffs' argument,
the majority gave the following example: if the veteran were restored to his position 3
days after his eligibility year and died suddenly within the next few hours, his estate
would be entitled to 40 hours of absence allowance credit according to the theory of the
plaintiffs; however, if he were to die hours before actual restoration became effective,
his estate would receive nothing in the way of absence allowance. Id.
148. Id. at 483. "[T]he cost to an employee of losing his job is not measured
by how much work he did in the past-no matter how calculated-but by the rights
and benefits he forfeits by giving up his job." Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S.
225, 230 (1966).
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The employer also argued that Eagar was not in point. Eagar,
the employer said, simply meant that if either "compensated service" or
"continuous employment" involves nothing more than being listed on
the company payroll for an unbroken period of time, military duty can-
not bar holiday pay and like benefits.149
Viewed in its entirety, the company's argument appears highly
persuasive. In the light of the previous veterans' reemployment rights
cases, it would seem necessary to supply another factor before the court
could justify the application of the act to one sort of benefit and deny its
applicability to others. The Bradley court, like the Tuttle court, claimed
to have isolated this factor as the requirement of "actual labor."
Military duty can never replace specific occupational skills, for which
reason the work requirements of most contracts like that in Bradley
have been designed. In sum, the Bradley court held that the plaintiff,
in his headlong rush to assert the most liberal view, had failed to ascer-
tain a vital limitation in approach:
We see no more reason under the agreement to require defendant
to pay plaintiffs the forty weeks absence allowance credit they have
not earned than to require defendant to pay them the wages plain-
tiffs would have earned but for their military service on the theory
that they had been "continuously employed" during the period they
spent in the armed forces. 50
Although the "actual labor" limitation might seem a viable one, the
analogy drawn in Bradley to salaried earnings is definitely improper.
The duration prerequisites to an award of absence allowance credit de-
termine only an employee's eligibility for benefits, while the perform-
ance of actual labor determines the degree of compensation such as
"wages." It is unlikely that Congress would guarantee a veteran his
seniority if he could not also obtain the benefits and advantages of that
seniority.
IV. The Future
In order to effectuate the purposes of subsection 9 of the Military
Selective Service Act of 19671'1 in future litigation concerning veter-
ans' rights to reemployment, the courts must recognize the differences
in character of the various benefits sought by returnees. In the period
since 1964, there has been little clarification, but the few cases that have
arisen have raised some distinct questions as to the scope of protection af-
forded these benefits.
In Diehl v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 52 and McKinney v.
149. 283 F. Supp. at 484-85.
150. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
151. 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(c) (1964).
152. 348 U.S. 960 (1955) (per curiam).
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Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.,"5 3 two decisions of the 1950's,
the Court indicated that benefits may be awarded under the "seniority"
right only if they would have automatically accrued "but for" military
service. In 1964 a more flexible standard, that of "reasonable cer-
tainty," was accepted in the consideration of eligibility for promotions
in the case of Tilton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.'54  And in the
two most recent Supreme Court cases, 155 an award has been justified for
benefits that had previously been held to be merely "other benefits"
rather than incidents of "seniority."
The question, then, is just how broad is the scope of the "seniority"
right? What limitations may employers make in the determination of
benefits for returning veterans which will not infringe upon this grow-
ing "seniority" concept? Because of the limited factual situations of
Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.150 and Eagar v. Magma Copper
Co.,157 the two latest Supreme Court decisions in this area, and because
of the per curiam form of the opinion in the latter decision, only the
lower courts have faced these complex questions. The majority have
sanctioned what appears to be an extremely broad interpretation of
"seniority" and they have justified the award of particular benefits (usu-
ally vacation pay) under the more liberal view of that term. Only one
of the decisions limiting the broad grant of benefits appears sound. In
that case, Tuttle v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,5 ' it was emphasized that
"seniority" does not govern if "actual labor" is the sole determinative
criterion for award. But this is not to be confused with the erroneous
approach taken in Bradley v. General Motors Corp.,'50 where the "ac-
tual labor" clause in the collective bargaining agreement was superim-
posed on the regular "seniority" provision. If this could be done, then
the protection of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 could be
avoided simply by the insertion of an "actual labor" clause in any union
agreement.
It is submitted that most of the practical difficulties in the veterans'
reemployment rights cases stem directly from the vagueness of Accardi
and Eagar. It is hoped that, in light of this situation and in light of
the serious conflicts among the courts, impetus will soon be generated
for another Supreme Court consideration of the subject. And at
that time the Court should clearly enunciate, not merely suggest by
153. 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
154. 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
155. Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (per curiam), rehearing
denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968); Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
156. 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
157. 389 U.S. 323 (1967).
158. 293 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ore. 1968).
159. 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
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way of per curiam opinion, the principles and practical considerations
to be used by lower courts.
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